As Donald Trump prepares to re-enter the White House, European leaders are anxiously bracing for a potential shift in how the U.S. engages with NATO, the EU, China, and Russia.
At the core of Trump’s foreign policy approach is his belief that EU and NATO allies, along with trade partners, have been “taking advantage” of the U.S. by failing to contribute their fair share to defence or balance trade. This stance has raised concerns among European NATO members, particularly as they confront their greatest security threat since World War II: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, a crisis that threatens the European cohesion and stability built since 1945.
Known for his blunt and provocative style, Trump recently suggested he might allow Russia to “do whatever the hell they want” if NATO members don’t meet their defence spending commitments. Is there a deeper message behind these words, or do they signal a drastic shift in U.S. policy toward Europe? As Donald Tusk put it, is “the era of geopolitical outsourcing really over?”
Trump has long criticised NATO’s European allies for failing to meet the alliance’s defence spending target of 2% of GDP, arguing that many rely on American military protection while neglecting their own defence responsibilities. This concern has been a consistent theme for Trump and his supporters. Yet, with Europe facing unprecedented security challenges, including Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, European leaders are left wondering: will Trump set aside his grievances to support NATO in these critical times, or will Europe be left to fend for itself?
Former U.S. ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul recently remarked, “Trump fundamentally does not care about Ukraine. But fundamentally does care about his personal relationship with Putin,” suggesting that Trump’s comments about letting Russia “do whatever the hell they want” may not be empty rhetoric. For European NATO members, this raises serious fears about the U.S.’s willingness to uphold NATO’s founding principle, Article 5, which states that an attack on one member is considered an attack on all.
Trump’s stance challenges this commitment, weakening NATO’s deterrent power and raising concerns about Europe’s security, especially as the continent relies heavily on American support. This could leave Eastern European nations, particularly Poland and the Baltic states, feeling vulnerable and uncertain about their defence in these precarious times.
In response to Trump’s conditional stance on NATO support, European leaders are increasingly calling for “strategic autonomy,” the ability for Europe to defend itself independently of American military support. While this concept isn’t new, the prospect of a Trump presidency, alongside the ongoing Russian threat, has accelerated Europe’s push for self-reliance.
This path is not without challenges, as Europe’s diverse defence budgets, priorities, and capabilities make coordination and investment complex. Nevertheless, the EU has begun investing in joint defence initiatives and strengthening its military infrastructure, laying the groundwork for a more self-sufficient Europe in the face of uncertain transatlantic ties.
Trump’s “America First” stance extends to trade, where he argues that the U.S. has been economically exploited by allies and trade partners. Trump has long criticised the EU for what he perceives as an unfair trade imbalance, claiming that European nations benefit disproportionately from trade with the U.S. while offering little in return. Trump is expected to push for tariffs of 10-20% on European imports, targeting industries that are central to export-heavy economies like Germany’s.
His fixation on trade imbalances defined his first term, using tariffs as a tool to pressure partners, including the EU, to revisit trade terms. European leaders fear that this approach could resurface, risking significant economic fallout and pushing the EU to diversify its trade relationships. Seeking to reduce its reliance on U.S. markets, Europe may look to strengthen ties with emerging economies like India and China shift that could introduce new layers of geopolitical complexity, especially as U.S.-China relations will likely edge closer to a breaking point during Trump’s second term.
The European Union may ultimately choose to ride out the next four years, viewing America’s shift under Trump as a temporary phase led by a “once-in-a-generation” firebrand president rather than a reflection of the U.S. as a whole. Rather than making drastic changes to military or trade policies, which could be costly and geopolitically fraught, Europe might opt to “bite their lips and get on with it,” hoping for more stability from a future administration.
However, given the significant security challenges Europe now faces including Russia’s ongoing aggression in Ukraine this passive approach may come with its risks. If Europe decides to wait it out rather than actively preparing for potential shifts in U.S. policy, the continent may find itself unprepared should American support waver further. For Ukraine, this could mean limited NATO involvement and a slower path to sustained support, while Russia may interpret Europe’s inaction as a sign of weakness, potentially emboldening its moves in the region.
Trump’s return to the White House poses complex challenges for the European Union, from defence commitments and strategic autonomy to trade relations. While some European leaders may prefer to wait out the next four years, hoping this is a temporary shift, the risks of relying on such an uncertain strategy are significant.
The need for a more self-reliant Europe, especially in defence and trade, has never been more urgent. As Europe faces its greatest security threat since World War II and growing economic pressures, the question remains whether it can afford to wait for stability or if this is the moment to redefine its role on the global stage. The decisions Europe makes now will have lasting consequences not only for its own security but also for the future of NATO, U.S.-EU relations, and the balance of power with Russia.
